ABSTRACT: The species category is defined as the smallest historical individual within which there is a parental pattern of ancestry and descent. The use of historical individual in this definition is consistent with the prevailing notion that species per se are not involved in processes --they are effects, not effectors. Reproductive isolation distinguishes biparental historical species from their parts, and it provides a basis for understanding the nature of the evidence used to discover historical individuals,
to individuals because only they have history (Cracraft 1987, p. 351; Frost and Wright 1988, p. 201) . For example, Mishler and Donoghue (1982) , Cracraft (1983 Cracraft ( , 1987 , Donoghue (1985) , Mishler and Brandon (1987) , and McKitrick and Zink (1988) reviewed the popular biological species concept (e.g,, Mayr 1942, p. 120 ; "species are groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations, which are reproductively isolated from other such groups"), and the principal problem they identified with that concept is that reproductive communities do not necessarily correspond to well corroborated clades. Such inconsistency seems to be especially true in plants (Chris Humphries, pets. comm.) .
All the aforementioned reviewers argued for an alternative phylogenetic (evolutionary) species concept, which has three things in common: (1) empirically investigating species with a cladistic analysis of synapomorphies scored among individual organisms (where ideally organism means entire life-cycle) or local populations of interbreeding organisms (demes) as terminal taxa (e.g., Kluge 1969 Kluge , 1988 de Queiroz and Donoghue 1988) ; (2) employing the rule of monophyly to achieve a consistent, genealogical taxonomy; ~ (3) attributing the category species to one of the least inclusive clades "within which there is a parental pattern of ancestry and descent" (Cracraft 1983, p. 170) .
According to Mishler and Donoghue (1982; see also Mishler and Brandon 1987, p. 406; 1989) , the species category is "the smallest 'important' lineage deemed worthy of formal recognition, where 'important' refers to the action of those processes that are dominant in producing and maintaining lineages in a particular case." Donoghue (1985, p. 179) would simply give "species rank to the smallest recognizable monophyletic or unresolved units" (see also Rosen 1978 Rosen , 1979 Nelson and Platnick 1981; Cracraft 1983 Cracraft , 1987 McKitrick and Zink 1988) . Mishler and Donoghue's (1982; see also Mishler and Brandon 1987; de Queiroz and Donoghue 1988) treatment is unsatisfactory because the pluralistic solution they propose for the 'species problem' "is the 'null hypothesis' that we should attempt to refute" (Sober 1984a, p. 341; see also Ghiselin 1987 Ghiselin , 1989 Frost and Wright 1988) . I believe there are two reasons why Donoghue's (1985) position will not be accepted widely. As I will discuss in detail below, it does not take into account the fact that species are generally considered to be products of evolution (lineages), but not the units participating in processes (neither the replicators or interactors; Hull 1980). Secondly, as the smallest clade, the species category is likely to be trivialized by the large numbers of taxa that will be recognized, and such taxa are likely to be unstable nomenclatorially. Further, Ereshefsky (1989) has criticized all the current formulations of the phylogenetic species concept on the grounds that they teach us little about the nature of species.
